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Right to Jury Trial in Ohio Civil Suits
Samuel M. Jones, III*
N MOST INSTANCES the right to a jury trial either clearly does
or does not exist. Yet there are some instances where this
constitutional' right is not clear. However, lawyers, pressed for
time and more concerned with substantive issues, fail to argue
the issue and thus it is rarely litigated.2 Those lawyers who are
concerned with the jury trial question, for tactical reasons or
otherwise, are hampered by a dearth of material providing ade-
quate guides in this area. This article is designed to fill this void.
The Pleadings Test
In that only legal causes of action are tried to a jury, a court
must first determine whether the case is to be tried in equity or
at law. To determine on which calendar the case should be
placed, the courts resolve the problem as soon as the pleadings
are closed. The general rule, as set forth in Raymond v. Railway
Company,' "is not what was the understanding of counsel, . . .
nor the form of judgment rendered," but rather what was the
nature of the action, as shown by the pleadings. 4 The courts then
compare the issues raised by the pleadings with similar cases as
they would have been tried at common law prior to the adoption
of the Ohio Constitution in 1803; 5 the so called "historical test."
And at the same time the courts at least ostensibly look to Sec-
tion 2311.04 of the Revised Code, 6 which defines the constitutional
right to a jury:
*Of the law firm of Thompson, Hine & Flory of Cleveland.
1 Ohio Const. art. 1, § 5; see Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296 (1854), for a his-
tory of the constitutional right.
2 Most of the cases involved the question of the right to appeal, there being
no such right, if the action was at law (prior to the enactment of Section
2502.23 of the Ohio Revised Code). But see, DeWees v. Spiliotis, 94 Ohio
App. 58, 115 N. E. 2d 703 (1953) [Boswell v. Ruppert, 115 Ohio App. 201
(1961)] which are two examples of recent cases where the jury right has
been litigated.
3 57 Ohio St. 271, 48 N. E. 1093 (1897).
4 Id. at 283.
5 Huling v. Columbus, 13 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 409 (1912), aff'd. on other
grounds by Walcutt v. Huling, 5 Ohio App. 326 (1913), aff'd. without opin-
ion 92 Ohio St. 518 (1915).
6 The predecessor to this section was enacted in 1853 when Ohio adopted
its version of the Field (New York) Code.
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Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of mon-
ey only, or specific real or personal property, shall be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived,...
In addition to the facts alleged in the pleadings, in many
instances the plaintiff's prayer for relief is looked to in order to
determine whether the case is at law or in equity; and a carefully
drafted prayer may in some instances be determinative, 7 even
though it has been held to be mere surplusage." As recently as
19611 the desirability of relying on the facts alone and disregard-
ing the prayer has been urged, although most cases have only
cited the Raymond case and have been content with stating that
the pleadings alone constitute the test. But in Reed's Administra-
tor v. Reed,10 the court suggested that a legal prayer improperly
affixed to an equitable cause of action is not always surplusage
and can have the ministerial or incidental role of advising the
defendant "of what use the plaintiff intends to make of his al-
leged facts." 11
Accordingly, where the facts make it easy for the court to
determine the equity-law question, the demand for relief is of
no worth. Where, however, the court has a more difficult choice
to make, the decisions are not so conclusive. For example, when
a cause of action entitles the plaintiff to either equitable or legal
relief (e.g., specific performance or damages in the alternative)
the courts have placed more significance on the prayer. In Grapes
v. Barbour,1 2 the plaintiff sued on two counts, the first on a
promissory note and the second a foreclosure of a mortgage. Be-
fore trial the plaintiff amended his petition so as to delete the
prayer for recovery on the note. The court held that the parties
were not entitled to a jury, obviously relying on plaintiff's prayer.
Similarly, in Corry v. Gaynor, the court said in dictum that where
7 In re Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 17 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 324 (Ct. App.
1913), aff'd., 91 Ohio St. (1914); Magee v. Kiesewetter, 98 Ohio App. 539,
130 N. E. 2d 704 (1955).
8 Corry v. Gaynor, 21 Ohio St. 277 (1871).
9 Martini v. Cicatello, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 289 (Ct. App. 1955); Boswell v. Rup-
pert, 115 Ohio App. 201 (1961). Also see Foster v. Hartman, 23 Ohio C. C.
R. (n.s.) 583 (1912), Dunn & Witt v. Kanniacher & Stark, 26 Ohio St. 497
(1875).
10 25 Ohio St. 422 (1874).
11 Id. at 424. See Phillips, Code Pleading 312 (2nd Ed. 1932).
12 58 Ohio St. 669, 49 N. E. 306 (1898).
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the plaintiff has two remedies, "the prayer may determine the
character of the action, because it is itself an election." 13
The question which Grapes and Corry did not have to answer
was: What if the first prayer had not been removed and both an
equitable and a legal prayer remained? Then the court should do
as Judge Clark suggested: Force the plaintiff to elect a remedy
rather than having the court construe his intent by interpreting
the language of the demand for relief.
14
Where Unclear Whether Law or Equity
Where at the time the pleadings are closed it is unclear
whether the cause of action is in law or equity, the case of Ma-
honing National Bank of Youngstown 15 provides some hint of a
workable solution. After pointing out that the facts and the re-
lationships of the parties had undergone momentous changes
since the first of many actions was commenced, the court said the
nature of the action in the first instance is not determinative but
rather,
it is important only to ascertain its present character as de-
termined by the issues made under the amended pleadings
upon which the rights were finally adjudicated at the time
of trial.",
Thus the court abandoned the usual test of examining the
pleadings after they are framed. Instead, the court realistically
looked to the case as it was tried before deciding the equity-law
question and stated the basis for a new test: "Viewing the action
as it was ultimately tried, it seems clear that it was a chancery
action triable to the court .... , 17
Where there is some doubt in the judge's mind before trial
on the equity-law question or additional facts may arise to
change the jurisdiction, the court should reserve decision on the
13 21 Ohio St. 277, 280 (1871). And it has been held that the plaintiff must
make an election. Pierce, Assignee v. Stewart, 61 Ohio St. 422, 56 N. E. 201
(1900). Contra, Leyman Corp. v. Piggly-Wiggly Corp., 90 Ohio App. 506,
103 N. E. 2nd 399 (1951). But see Glander v. Mendenhall, 39 Ohio L. Abs.
104 (Ct. App. 1943); DeWees v. Spiliotis, 94 Ohio App. 394, 115 N. E. 2nd
703 (1953).
14 Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading 35 Yale L. J. 259, 289-90 (1926).
Also see Brundidge v. Goodlove, 30 Ohio St. 374, 377 (1876), where "the
plaintiff insisted upon a money judgment .. ." and was entitled to a jury.
15 143 Ohio St. 523, 56 N. E. 2d 218 (1944).
16 Id. at 532. Emphasis added.
17 Id. at 535-36. Emphasis added.
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right to a jury and wait until after trial when the question can
be unequivocally answered. The trial judge should place the
case on the jury calendar with the intention that both the judge
and the jury will hear the case, the judge to decide after the
trial whose decision, judge or jury, shall be accepted. The case
must be tried to both triers of fact, even though it may turn out
that the parties have been subjected to unnecessary delay and
expense if the case is held to be one in equity. On the other
hand, if it is subsequently determined that the case was one at
law, and a jury was not impaneled, the trial or appellate judge
would be forced to rule for a new trial, which would be even
more wasteful of time and money. Presenting the case before
both judge and jury eliminates the necessity of a second trial,
regardless of whether the case is found to be one at law or in
equity. Further, the case will originally be placed on the jury
calendar and the parties will not have to take the risk of being
removed from the judge's calendar to the bottom of the jury
calendar, if it should later be determined before trial that the
case should be tried at law. Last, a party, who may not realize
what his best remedy is until trial is over, will not have to take
the risk of making a wrong choice and be collaterally estopped
on the best remedy at a later trial.
Legislative Definition of the Jury Right
It appears that the statutory definition of the constitutional
right to a jury trial may have encroached upon what was his-
torically equity jurisdiction. In other words, Section 2311.04 ex-
tended the right beyond that which existed at common law.
When the question arose as to whether or not the legislature
could alter the constitutional definition of the jury right by en-
acting the predecessor to Section 2311.04, it was held in Gunsaul-
lus v. Pettit s that where "money only" is requested, the jury
right exists and "it is immaterial whether his right of action is
based upon what were formerly regarded as equitable princi-
ples. .. ." 19 Thus, according to the Gunsallus ruling the jury
right can exist even though historically the cause of action was
in equity.
18 46 Ohio St. 27, 17 N. . 231 (1888). Also see Brundidge v. Goodlove, 30
Ohio St. 374 (1876).
19 Id. at 28-29.
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Despite the abortive effort of a subsequent case20 to prevent
the courts from reading the language "money only" as applying
to cases where demand for a money judgment would invoke
equity, the court in Improvement Co. v. Malone,21 reaffirmed
that where the plaintiff was seeking "money only" a jury trial
must be had as a matter of statutory right, even if equity might
have taken over in the absence of the statute. But in Huling v.
Columbus,22 albeit a lower court, Judge Kinkead,23 who admir-
ably explained his decision in historical terms,24 criticized the
Gunsaullus and Malone cases. In Gunsaullus the suit was
brought by the administrator of the deceased wife against the ad-
ministrator of the deceased husband's estate for money which the
defendant was to hold in trust and invest for the plaintiff. The
court in Gunsaullus assumed that the case was in equity. Judge
Kinkead said, however, that the trust relationship had nothing
to do with the money relief sought; that when the defendant
received the money a simple implied contract to repay arose,
upon which the plaintiff could sue in assumpsit. Thus, argued
Judge Kinkead, the Gunsaullus case, which stated that the stat-
ute could encroach upon chancery, was not relevant to the deci-
sion because assumpsit is at law; and the language concerning
the right to encroach upon equity jurisdiction was only dictum.
In Malone, Judge Kinkead's dictum pointed out that the
plaintiff sued for money on a contract, claiming equity jurisdic-
tion because the items of account were numerous and required
an equitable accounting; but the mere fact that there are num-
erous items in the accounting is not enough to invoke equity
jurisdiction since, historically, there must be a proper relation-
ship between the parties as well, such as a fiduciary relation-
ship, which did not exist.
If Huling v. Columbus is followed, then equity and law as
we know it will remain intact. Yet the Gunsaullus dictum has
been resurrected. In Herman v. Ohio Finance Co.,25 it was said
in dictum that "The amount of money due from one to the other
20 Black, Receiver v. Boyd, 50 Ohio St. 46, 33 N. E. 207 (1893), overruled
by Improvement Co. v. Malone, 78 Ohio St. 232, 85 N. E. 51 (1908).
21 Ibid.
22 13 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 409 (1912), aff'd. on other grounds by Walcutt v.
Huling, 5 Ohio App. 326, aff'd. without opinion 92 Ohio St. 518 (1915).
23 Kinkead, Code Pleading (2nd Ed. 1898).
24 13 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 415-16 (1912).
25 66 Ohio App. 164, 32 N. E. 2d 28 (1940).
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was the major issue, and the accounting was incidental only to
the main relief sought." 26 But there was no right to an account-
ing at all, and it cannot, therefore, be "incidental." By calling it
incidental the court incorrectly implied that equity is relegated
to a lesser position by the legal relief sought.
No express doctrine that Section 2311.04 encroaches upon
equity, however, has ever been promulgated. But even if there
is an encroachment upon equity, is it not just a ruling that a jury
shall take the place of the judge in an equity trial? There is no
reason why the legislature could not provide for jury trials in
equity cases. Yet Section 2311.04 does not give such a mandate,
and the legislature should speak with more certainty before such
a reform is effected.
The fact is that many cases have been decided which give
equity and law the proper respect due without even mentioning
the dictum. In Hull v. Bell Bros. & Co.,27 in which the buyer
sought specific performance of a realty contract, the court held
that such an action is traditionally one in equity though it might
be argued that the plaintiff, who is the buyer, is seeking "the
recovery of real property," as defined by Section 2311.04. A
more plausible argument, however, can be made where it is the
seller who brings the action for specific performance; he tenders
his deed and seeks "money only" in return. But the courts2 8
have held that the seller's action, too, is traditionally an equi-
table action for specific performance, in part because equities
must be "determined" and "judicial discretion" 29 exercised by
the court before a money judgment can be rendered. (And ac-
tions for specific performance are historically in equity regard-
less of statutory language, logic or policy.)
But why do not the courts spell out the historical test as
Judge Kinkead did in Huling v. Columbus? Perhaps the judges
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were so famil-
iar with code pleading that the application of the test was taken
for granted. The lawyer today who construes literally the lan-
guage of Section 2311.04 finds himself confused when he attempts
to match the statute against the unarticulated historical test. An
example of court confusion is found in Bricker v. Elliot,5 0 where
26 Id. at 167.
27 54 Ohio St. 228, 43 N. E. 584 (1896).
28 Pierce v. Stewart, 61 Ohio St. 422, 56 N. E. 201 (1900).
29 Id. at 424-25. Also see Jones v. Booth, 38 Ohio St. 405 (1892).
30 55 Ohio St. 577, 45 N. E. 1045 (1897).
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equity assumed jurisdiction because there was no adequate rem-
edy at law. Yet the court in Bricker dealt with the fact that all
the beneficiary wanted was "money only" from the trustee, from
whom he was seeking an accounting. Reaching the right result
with the wrong reason, the court said:
But an action is not for the recovery of money only if it
invokes the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, which must
be found, if at all, in that prolific source of equitable juris-
diction-the inadequacy of legal remedies.3 1
The reason is wrong because the plaintiff was not seeking equi-
table relief, but only money. Equitable relief is only the means
by which he seeks his end, viz. "money only." Section 2311.04
has nothing whatsoever to do with the means, i.e., the type of
jurisdiction, which the plaintiff is forced to use. If the court in
the Bricker case had used the statutory test and had disregarded
the historical test, the result would have to be different; the
parties would have to get their jury trial, and traditional equity
jurisdiction would be encroached upon. That is because all the
plaintiff was seeking was "money only," and according to the
words of the statute it makes no difference if he had to go into
equity to get it. What the court should have done before liter-
ally construing the naked language of the statute to justify its
decision was to look to the intent of the drafters of the codes.
The statute was intended only to codify the distinction between
equity and law made by the common law prior to the adoption
of the Constitution.32
Brick & Mining Co. v. Schatzinger,33 which involved a con-
tractual dispute between three parties, defends the historical
test and demonstrates that it was not completely arbitrary. In
holding that equity assumed jurisdiction the court said:
The pleadings presented such a three cornered lawsuit that
it could not possibly have been tried to a jury; that the rules
governing jury trials would have prevented the working
out of the equities which we conceive underlie the law-suit.
34
31 Id. at 580.
32 Huling v. Columbus, supra n. 22 at 415-416.
33 14 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 356 (1905), aff'd. without opinion 74 Ohio St. 441,
78 N. E. 1136 (1906). Also see Martin v. Cicatello, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 289 (Ct.
App. 1955).
34 Id. at 357. Emphasis added.
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Yet the Schatzinger case, too, had the same shortcoming that
the Bricker case had. It cited the non sequitur that a suit requir-
ing the invocation of equity is not a suit for "money only," even
though money is all that the plaintiff is seeking. Once again, it
is the lip service that is paid to Section 2311.04, and the court's
feeling that it must twist the latter to concur with the historical
test that is causing all the confusion.
Ultimately, the test is simple: Is equitable relief a condition
precedent35 for the plaintiff to acquire the ultimate relief that he
is seeking? If not, the action is at law. In order to ascertain if
equitable relief is a condition precedent, the historical test must
be applied first.
Principal Relief Sought Test
Where the plaintiff prays for and is entitled to both equita-
ble and legal relief, it appears at first blush that the courts have
abrogated equity's jurisdiction. This is because in this two-
headed action the courts have altered the common law historical
test. The new test was first set out in Chapman v. Lee,36 where,
instead of holding that the plaintiff was entitled to both equitable
and legal relief, the court apparently forced the plaintiff to make
an election: 
37
What was the primary object sought? If it was a judgment
for money . . . and the allegations of the answers did not
change the character of the case attempted to be made, the
mere fact that the petition contains allegations which seem
to invoke some of the equity powers of the court, will not
necessarily change the character of the action . . 38
In the Chapman case attorneys were suing their former clients
for legal services rendered, praying for both a money judgment,
an equitable lien and an accounting for the money judgment the
defendants had won in a former action. The court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled only to a money judgment-an action at
law-and that their allegations for equitable relief were "imma-
terial and unimportant." 39
35 Dreher v. Pattison Supply Co., 23 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 54, 57 (1907).
36 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N. E. 736 (1887).
37 See note 13 supra.
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Despite the language quoted above, since the plaintiff was
not entitled to any equitable relief at all, there could not be any
encroachment on equity. The language in the Chapman case,
"primary object sought," was ill-chosen, because there was no
right to equitable relief at all. Thus the "primary object sought"
test, which has its origin in the Chapman case, was dictum.
The confusion arose in those cases which followed the Chap-
man dictum, where the plaintiffs actually were entitled to both
equitable and legal relief. Obviously troubled by the prospect
of dual relief, and feeling that either equity or law should have
exclusive jurisdiction, the courts seized upon the "primary ob-
ject sought" or "principal relief sought" test. For example, in
Kiriakis v. Fountis,40 where the plaintiff sought cancellation of
a promissory note for $1,500, an injunction preventing the trans-
fer of the note, and a money judgment for $251.10 wrongfully
withheld by the defendant, the court held that the main relief
sought was a money judgment and the equitable relief only inci-
dental. On remand the holding would first require a jury trial
on the legal claim for money, which, if the plaintiff was to lose
on it, might collaterally estop issues in the subsequent equity
trial on the prayer for cancellation and injunction. Thus, by los-
ing a trial for only $251.10 the plaintiff might find himself bound
to pay an invalid note for $1,500. How could any court conclude
that the latter is "incidental" to the claim for a relatively insig-
nificant money amount? Even assuming that a determination of
the "principal relief sought" must be made, in the Kiriakis case
the "principal relief sought" was clearly equitable relief. Besides
constituting a much larger sum of money, the equitable relief
was prayed for first and the money relief last. If such a test must
exist that which the plaintiff prays for first should give some indi-
cation of that which he considers to be "principal."
The Kiriakis case illustrates the dangers inherent in "the
principal relief sought" test: How is the court to make the deter-
mination? What standards are to be used in doing so? Should
not the plaintiff be asked, either by requiring him to make a
more definite statement or by testifying orally in court, what he
considers to be the "primary object" of his suit?
In Wall v. Federation Co.,41 the plaintiff sued the company
for wrongfully withholding his money. The plaintiff prayed for a
40 109 Ohio St. 553, 143 N. E. 129 (1923).
41 121 Ohio St. 334, 168 N. E. 847 (1929).
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money judgment, an accounting, a receiver and an injunction to
prevent the defendant from disposing of the property. The court's
holding that the action was at law since money was the "main
relief sought," 42 appears at first to be incorrect, particularly
since a receiver and an injunction might have been needed imme-
diately, long before the trial of the legal issue, so as to prevent
the defendant from disposing of the money during the pre-trial
period. But the equitable claims which the court called "inci-
dental" and "ancillary" were dependent on the success of the
plaintiff in the action at law for a money judgment. Before the
plaintiff was entitled to an injunction and other equitable relief,
the court had to determine that the defendant owed the money.
Thus the court in Wall actually applied the "threshold issue" test
instead of the ambiguous "principal relief sought" test. This is
the language which the Wall case should have used, though it
could be argued that the equitable issues are "ancillary" to the
legal issues if one interprets "ancillary" as meaning "dependent
on."
The court in Nordin v. Coulton43 did, however, decide a case
similar to the Wall case in language which came close to articu-
lating the "threshold issue" test. Though the court first said that
a money judgment was the "primary" or paramount relief asked
by the plaintiff, the court went on to say: "Until he (plaintiff) is
found entitled to a judgment in some amount, no foreclosure can
be had .. ."44
The "threshold issue" test should be adopted, and when the
equitable and legal claims sought are causally unrelated so as to
fall outside the "threshold"-type fact situation, the plaintiff
should designate which relief he wants, and not force the court
to make the choice itself.
Yet despite the "principal relief sought" test, it appears that
a party, by carefully framing two separate, distinct causes of ac-
tion in his petition, can prevent equity from taking over the law
issues, and thereby prevent a court from treating them as only
"incidental." In Bingham v. Nypano Rd. Co.,45 the plaintiff
sought to have an employment contract reformed and then sue
42 Id. at 337.
43 142 Ohio St. 277, 51 N. E. 2d 717 (1943). Also see Rowland v. Entrekin,
27 Ohio St. 47, (1875); Fisher v. Bower, 79 Ohio St. 248 (1909); Contra,
Oetjen v. Goff-Kirby Co., 38 Ohio L. Abs. 117 (Ct. App. 1942).
44 Id. at 278.
45 112 Ohio St. 115, 147 N. E. 1 (1925).
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for damages on the contract as reformed. The trial court, sitting
in equity, reformed the contract and then impaneled a jury,
which awarded $12,000 to the plaintiff. Since the reformation of
the contract was a condition precedent-a "threshold issue"-the
equitable issue had to be tried first. But since the suit was not
for "money only" and, indeed, required going into equity to re-
form the contract, the court could have tried the entire case be-
fore the judge, using the rationale that the "principal relief
sought" was equitable and the legal relief was "incidental" there-
to. But the court said that it had a separate jury trial because
the case could have been divided into two lawsuits, and a party
should not lose his jury right in the second because he joined two
actions into one lawsuit.
46
Defenses and Counterclaims
Where the defendant poses an equitable defense to a legal
cause of action, the plaintiff may find that his jury right has
been destroyed. In Buckner v. Mear,47 the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant for breach of covenants in a deed conveying realty. The
defendant alleged that the covenants were inserted by mutual
mistake and asked to have the deed reformed. The trial court
decided the case by passing on the issues raised by the "counter-
claim" 48 for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. In hold-
ing that the defendant's answer (or "counter-claim") changed
the action from law to equity, the court said:
(W)here new matter set up in the answer constitutes an
equitable cause of action, which, if established, extinguished
or supersedes the case made in the petition, the issues taken
on such new matter are triable by the court, and not as of
right by a jury.
• .. If the equitable case should be established, the de-
cree would end the whole controversy and settle the rights
of the parties. But if the defendant should fail in his equi-
table case, the issues raised on the petition would have to be
disposed of (with a jury trial) before the case could pass to
final judgment.49
46 Contra, Ellsworth v. Holcomb, 28 Ohio St. 66 (1875).
47 26 Ohio St. 514 (1875). Also see Smith v. Anderson, 20 Ohio St. 76
(1870); Bank v. Weygand, 30 Ohio St. 126 (1876); Raymond v. Railroad Co.,
57 Ohio St. 271, 48 N. E. 1093 (1893); Gowdy v. Roberts, 31 Ohio App. 33,
166 N. E. 141 (1929); Deaconess Hospital v. Leutz, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 270 (Ct.
App. 1932); Boswell v. Ruppert, 115 Ohio App. 201 (1961).
48 Id. at 515.
49 Id. at 516-17.
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Indeed, once the contract was reformed and the covenants strick-
en, the plaintiff, who had sued upon the covenants which there-
tofore had existed, would no longer have a cause of action; and
once the cause of action is gone there is no longer any constitu-
tional right to a jury.
But Buckner was careful to point out that not "any new
matter" in the defense could deprive the plaintiff of his jury
right. It had to be new matter which would also make the de-
fense a counter-claim, viz., "facts recognized by courts of law
or equity as constituting an existing cause of action. . . ." Yet
Gill v. Pelkey'0 imposed an additional limitation and said not
"any counter-claim" constituting a "distinct cause of action" can
destroy the jury right. It must be one which requires "affirma-
tive action" on the part of the court-a situation where in order
to give the defendant full relief on his equitable defense the
court must go into equity and alter the status quo, since law is
historically prohibited from making such drastic changes. In
other words, where a judgment voiding a debt is sufficient, this
is not "affirmative relief"; but where the void debt is represented
by an instrument which is not in the defendant's possession, an
equitable decree commanding the possessor to hand over or
destroy the instrument is "affirmative relief," necessary to give
the successful defendant full protection. Thus, a jury can void a
debt, but only "the interposition of a court of equity" 51 can
reach out and destroy the instrument evidencing the debt.
Though the affirmative relief test is not illusory or shadowy,
as Clark has written, it is true that it should not be labeled
equitable defense and counterclaim at each pole, since these
terms are equivocal and used interchangeably. 52 But the dis-
tinction should be kept intact to preserve that which equity
could always do while law had its hands tied. Any labels can
be used, and perhaps it would be best to call both "defenses," as
Judge Clark suggested."3 Nevertheless, some change is needed,
for there are some instances where equitable defenses require
a court trial first and counterclaims do not affect the plaintiff's
jury right (and vice versa).
50 54 Ohio St. 348, 43 N. E. 991 (1896).
51 Quebec Bank v. Weygand & Jung, 30 Ohio St. 126, 131 (1876).
52 Clark, Code Pleading 430-31 (2nd Ed. 1947).
53 Id. at 429.
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The rule of Buckner v. Mear54 is reversed when a petition
states a cause of action in equity to which the defendant poses a
legal counterclaim. In Sallady v. Webb,5 5 plaintiff-assignee
sought to foreclose a purchase money mortgage. The defendant-
mortgagor answered, alleging that the mortgagee-assignor had
induced him to purchase by misrepresenting the location of the
boundaries, for which he sought damages. The court said that
the plaintiff's cause of action was equitable and that the answer
constituted a legal cross-demand. The court then held that the
mortgagee-assignor owed the defendant an amount greater than
that which the plaintiff-assignee sought in his original action.
The court, after citing the Buckner case, applied the rule of the
same case but with the equitable and legal claims in exactly
reverse positions. The issue raised by the defendant's counter-
claim, that he was induced to purchase by misrepresentation,
reached to the issue of the making of the mortgage. According-
ly, if the defendant should win on his counterclaim, the entire
contract would be invalidated and the plaintiff's cause of action
would be "extinguished."
Why should the entire action take on the form of trial creat-
ed by the issues raised in the counterclaim? Should not the
plaintiff, he who takes the initiative to first file suit, be allowed
the form of trial to which his cause of action entitles him? The
courts have suggested two reasons: First, the "extinguishment"
doctrine is based on historical experience that certain issues of
fact are tried more efficiently by a jury than by a judge (and
vice versa). Second, the fact that the plaintiff brings his action
against the defendant before the latter gets to court to assert his
claim does not give the plaintiff any vested right as to the form
of trial.
Yet the plaintiff's legal or equitable cause of action is not
completely destroyed by the Buckner and Sallady rule, but be-
comes contingent on his success in a court or jury trial on the
issues raised by the defendant's counterclaim. Thus the Buckner
and Sallady rule does not necessarily affect any substantive
rights, but only the order of trials. Of course, if in actuality the
defendant should win on the counterclaim, the plaintiff will be
collaterally estopped by those issues decided adversely to him.
54 Supra n. 48.
55 20 Ohio C. C. R. 553 (1887). Also see City National Bank v. Brown, 12
Ohio Dec. 62 (C. P. 1899).
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The Jury Right and New Statutory Actions
If Ohio courts continue the practice of strictly construing
the language of section 2311.04, in theory at least the constitu-
tional right to a jury could be placed in jeopardy when trial by
jury, as under common law, does not fit into the statutory cate-
gories of recovery of money et al. Probably the only common
law cause of action with a jury right which would not meet the
statutory requirements is that of an abatement of a nuisance, and
this ancient cause of action has been abandoned in favor of in-
junctive relief in Ohio.
The jury right might, however, be encroached upon where
a new action, similar to an action which existed at common law,
is created by statute. In such instances, there is a doctrine that
the Constitution protects the right to a jury only in those actions
which existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. In Haus-
wirth v. Board of Review,56 the plaintiff was seeking unemploy-
ment compensation; the court held that the legislature did not
provide for and the Constitution did not require a jury.
Similarly, in Brawley v. Thomas, Admr.,57 where the plain-
tiff sought a finding that she was the wife of the deceased under
the Determination of Heirship Act,58 the court held there was no
jury right because the action was within the jurisdiction of pro-
bate which has no provision for juries. The court further said
that even though the recovery of money "may be the ultimate
result . . . , that is the shadow and not the substance of the
act." 59
Yet the fact that a statutory action is passed subsequent to
the adoption of the Constitution should not mean that in all cases
a jury trial is precluded. Quite to the contrary, a jury right is
often granted or denied by applying another test. For instance,
in In re Estate of Blue,60 the court went to some lengths to analo-
gize the section of the probate code involving testamentary mat-
ters as they had been treated historically. Since they are tradi-
tionally in chancery, the court held the case should be tried be-
fore the probate judge.
56 69 Ohio App. 79, 43 N. E. 2d 240 (1941).
57 82 Ohio App. 400, 81 N. E. 2d 719 (1947).
58 Ohio Rev. Code. ch. 2123.
59 Brawley v. Thomas, Admr., supra n. 57 at 407.
60 67 Ohio App. 37, 32 N. E. 2d 499 (1939). Also see In re Estate of Helf-
rich, 30 Ohio N. P. (ns.) 307 (C. P. 1933).
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Conversely, the right to a jury under the Wrongful Death
Act appears to have been arrived at by analogizing it to tort
actions. Presumably, if the right did arise by analogy to an ac-
tion in tort, the new right under the statute will be entitled to
the same constitutional protection as the analogous common law
action. In the Wrongful Death Act there is a brief mention of
a jury trial, though the statute does not expressly say that there
must be a right to a jury. Section 2525.02 of the Revised Code
reads in part:
The jury may give such damages as it thinks proportioned
to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the
persons.
Is this enough of a reference to a jury to make the right a statu-
tory right and not a constitutional right arrived at by analogy to
common law actions? Arguably, it cannot be both a constitution-
al and a statutory right because the Constitution protects only
that right that existed before its adoption, and the statutory
right (if it exists) was passed long afterwards. More reasonably,
however, even where there is a reference to a jury trial in the
act which creates the statutory cause of action, a court will con-
strue the jury right as both a constitutional and a statutory
right. The fact that the legislature chose to spell out the jury
right in the statute may have been done because it feared that
the courts would not find that the constitutional right existed by
analogy; or it may have been added just as a statutory definition
of the constitutional right which the legislature assumed already
existed. The latter view, which is certainly the more tenable of
the two, is identical to Section 2311.04's relationship to the con-
stitutional right: The constitutional right and the statutory right
are not mutually exclusive, both may exist concurrently.
This question is significant not only in considering the
Wrongful Death Act but also in any statutory action which may
have some slight reference to a jury. If it is a mere statutory
right, then the legislature which creates it can take it away. In
contrast, if it is a constitutional right, the right can only be
destroyed by constitutional amendment. Thus, under the first
interpretation, the legislature could take away the right to a
jury in a Wrongful Death action, if the constitutional right was
found not to exist. Section 2525.02 of the Wrongful Death Act
is not, however, such a specific reference that could preempt the
constitutional right which otherwise exists by analogy to the
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12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
common law action in tort. Instead, the quoted language of the
section simply defines the duties of the jury, the existence of
which the legislature assumed without question.
Last, besides applying the test of analogy the courts quite
properly look to the mechanics of the statute creating the new
statutory action. For example, Kennedy v. Thompson6 ' held
that the judgment which a statute calls for is of great signifi-
cance. Since the judgment was "equitable in its nature," 62 the
court found the action to be one in equity.
Waiver of the Right to a Jury Trial
A. Waiver by Statute
Section 2315.20 provides when parties have waived a jury
trial:
In actions arising on contract, trial by jury may be waived
by the parties, and in other actions with the assent of the
Court as follows:
(A) By consent of the party appearing, when the other
party fails to appear at the trial, in person or by
attorney;
(B) By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed
with the clerk;
(C) By oral consent in open court entered on the jour-
nal.
Accordingly, some kind of affirmative consent to waive is
required except where a party fails to attend trial: If a party
does not choose to exercise his right to defend himself, a fortiori,
he should not have a right to a jury trial. Moreover, where a
party fails to defend himself at trial it is most unlikely that the
jury will find in his behalf; and even if it should, the judge
would probably be compelled to grant a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict.
The courts have rigidly adhered to the language of Sub-
section A of Section 2315.20 which requires appearance at the
trial,63 and have even held that a party must appear at trial even
though he had previously demanded a jury in his answer.64
61 30 Ohio C. C. R. 446, 2 Ohio C. C. Dec. 254 (1888).
62 Id.
63 Railroad Co. v. Construction Co., 49 Ohio St. 681, 32 N. E. 961 (1892).
64 Crellin v. Armstrong, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 295, 32 N. E. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 1936).
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B. Implied Waiver In General
Section 2315.20 does not provide for the situation when par-
ties go to trial without either expressly asking for a jury or
expressly waiving, and then afterwards, asserting that they had
been deprived of their jury right. Bonewitz v. Bonewitz,65 held
that waiver could be implied even though the express provisions
of the statute had not been followed. The court stated that a
"jury was not demanded" and, even though the right was not
waived in words, "actions sometimes speak louder than
words." 66
In no way can a rule that waiver can come about by conduct
or estoppel be inferred from the statute.67 Whitworth v. Steers,
68
which preceded Bonewitz, implied that the statutory methods of
effecting waiver were not exclusive. In order to reach the con-
clusion that statutory waiver is not exclusive, the court appar-
ently read the word "may" in Section 2315.20 as being permis-
sive, and therefore not exclusive.
Even before Bonewitz there was some authority which re-
quired a party to make an affirmative demand to preserve his
right. In Averill Coal & Oil Co. v. Verner,69 the court referred
the case to a referee over defendant's objection. The court rea-
soned that a mere objection to a referral could not be equated to
a demand for a jury, and the court held the jury right was
waived. But in Monroe v. Golner,70 the court held that an in-
formal request for a jury trial was sufficient. Thus, an objection
to the withdrawal of the jury, or any utterance which clearly
demonstrates that a party wants a jury should take the case out
of the Bonewitz doctrine.
C. Implied Waiver Before Trial
The dictum in Younger & Co. v. Halliday7' states that an
express waiver might be dissolved by a subsequent amendment
of the pleadings. But in this case the court analyzed plaintiff's
65 50 Ohio St. 373, 34 N. E. 322 (1893).
66 Id. at 377-78.
67 Whitworth v. Steers, Ohio C. C. Dec. 556 (1893) aff'd. without opinion
53 Ohio St. 686, 44 N. E. 1150; Torbet v. Young, 24 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 97
(Ct. App. 1915).
68 Id.
69 22 Ohio St. 372 (1872). Also see Manley v. W. & L. E. Ry. Co., 24 Ohio
C. C. R. 70 (1902).
70 101 Ohio App. 290, 139 N. E. 2d 485 (1956).
71 107 Ohio St. 431, 140 N. E. 340 (1923).
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amended petition and held that the amendment affected only
the remedy and not the issues a jury would decide. Accordingly,
the prior waiver was not expunged.
Where the amendment raises new issues of fact, a party
wishing to abandon his waiver as to the old issues of fact in the
first petition might be aided by Raymond v. Railroad Company,
72
which held that the court will look "wholly to the amended
pleadings, disregarding the original. .... ,, 73 Thus, it might be
argued that jury issues waived before the plaintiff's amendment
could be tried to a jury because of the amended pleading.
The waiver problem has come up on a demurrer. In Lingler
v. Wesco,74 the plaintiff brought a replevin action, after which
he took over the property. The defendant's demurrer to the peti-
tion was upheld, and the trial court proceeded to award the de-
fendant damages for the plaintiff's wrongful taking. The court
held that the plaintiff, who on appeal alleged his right to a jury
on the damage issue, had waived his right by not making a jury
demand at the time of the hearing on the demurrer, when evi-
dence on the damage issue had been introduced. Thus the court
in Lingler, which expressly followed Bonewitz, extended the
waiver doctrine to a time ahead of trial, though the hearing on
the damage issue was in effect a "trial."
Before trial, even when an affirmative waiver has been
made, a party has not necessarily lost his right if he should
change his mind. In Moknach v. New York Life Ins. Co.,75 both
parties waived a jury at pre-trial hearing. Later, the plaintiff
made a motion for a jury trial, which the trial court sustained to
insure that plaintiff might have the benefit of "every legal
right." 76 The appellate court affirmed, holding that the matter
was in the discretion of the trial court, implying that if the plain-
tiff had made her motion only to delay the litigation, the trial
judge was best able to make such a finding.
D. Implied Waiver at Trial
An early case held that once the case is set down to trial
with witnesses summoned and "preparation made by the parties
72 57 Ohio St. 271, 48 N. E. 1093 (1897).
73 Id. at 284.
74 79 Ohio St. 225, 86 N. E. 1004 (1906). Cf. Bellows v. Bowlus, 83 Ohio
App. 90 (1948).
75 67 Ohio App. 293, 36 N. E. 2d 529 (1941).
76 Id. at 294.
May, 1963
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss2/15
JURY TRIAL IN OHIO
to dispense with a jury, ... except in special cases," 77 both par-
ties have waived their right. Modern courts seem, however, to
have dropped such a rigid test and have left the question of
waiver during the course of the trial to the discretion of the trial
judge.78 But apparently no trial judge has ever granted a de-
mand for a jury after the commencement of trial, and the court
in Hamilton v. Miller79 denied a motion for a jury at the end of
the first day of trial.
E. Waiver by Concurrent Motions for Directed
Verdicts Abolished
Prior to 1958 the rule was that when both parties moved for
directed verdicts, they waived their right to a jury. But in
Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Eblens0 the Supreme Court, ex-
pressly overruling several of its earlier decisions including First
National Bank v. Hayes,8' held that when both parties moved for
directed verdicts they did not waive their right to a jury.
G. The Impracticality of the Waiver Rule
The waiver rule is impractical because until the trial begins
neither the court nor the parties know with any degree of cer-
tainty whether there will be a jury trial. Nor is there any more
certainty when a party has expressly waived his right, since it
has been held that the party may revoke his waiver. Thus under
Section 2315.20 courts are unable to plan their trial dockets
ahead of time to facilitate the speedy handling of cases. Now,
courts and parties must wait until the day of trial to determine
whether or not impaneling of jurors will commence.
In that the present rule is so impractical, the legislature or
the courts themselves should alter the present waiver rules and
adopt a rule similar to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,8 2 requiring that the parties demand their right by a
certain date.
77 Hauser v. Metzger, 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 478, 1 Cinc. Super. Ct. Rep. 164,
165 (1871). Emphasis added.
78 Hamilton v. Miller, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 55 (Ct. App. 1936). But see, Insur-
ance Co. v. Michael, 33 Ohio C. C. R. 477, 14 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 95 (1911).
79 Id.
80 167 Ohio St. 189, 147 N. E. 2d 486 (1958). See commentary: 27 U. Cinc.
L. Rev. 334 (1958); 28 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 205 (1958); 18 A. L. R. 1433, 108
A. L. R. 1315.
81 64 Ohio St. 100, 59 N. E. 893 (1901).
82 Many states have Rule 38-type statutes. Annot., 64 A. L. R. 2d 506.
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Such a statute, by eliminating the need for non-statutory
waiver, would thus eliminate the vagueness of any doctrine of
"implied" waiver. It would also enable the trial courts to plan
their jury dockets ahead of time. Section 2315.20 makes no pro-
vision for planning calendars, and under Bonewitz, which has
filled the void left by the statute, the courts only require the
parties to make their demands before trial. Unfortunately, the
courts themselves cannot impose a Rule 38-type rule; it requires
legislative fiat for reasons set out more fully below.
Attempts by the Legislature and the Judiciary to Change
the WAIVER RULE
Statutes designed to relieve the crowded Cuyahoga County
trial docket have been held unconstitutional as local legislation
not applying to the entire state. In Silberman v. Hay,8 3 the test
case for the first such statute, the defendant requested a jury at
the time of the trial. The request was denied because it was not
made at least five days before trial in accordance with the Cuya-
hoga County Jury Law. The Supreme Court, however, granted
a new trial with a jury, reasoning that even though the statute
applied to all counties of certain class, in fact it would apply only
to the largest, Cuyahoga County. Most important, "There is
probably in the entire field of legislation, no subject of a more
general nature . . . than the right of trial by jury," 84 and most
special class legislation which refers to general matters is uncon-
stitutional. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's argument that
Cuyahoga County was so unique as to require special legislation,
suggesting at the same time that the problem could be solved by
increasing the size of the judiciary.
An attempt to change the waiver rule was made by the
common pleas court judges of Cuyahoga County. The court-
made rule, which was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 5 required each party
to demand in writing a twelve-man jury. The defendant urged
that the rule did not conflict with the state statutes, and that
83 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 N. E. 258 (1898). Also see Security Insurance Co. v.
Michael, 14 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 95 (1911); Goerlich, Restrictions on the
Right of Trial by Jury, 3 Ohio St. L. J. 184 (1937); Annots., 755 A. L. R.
789, 64 A. L. R. 2d 506.
84 Id. at 587.
85 127 Ohio St. 278, 188 N. E. 1 (1933). Also see Gertner, The Inherent
Powers of Courts to Make Rules, 10 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 32 (1936).
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"those statutes cannot be used to impair the judicial power and
the inherent rule-making power of the court." 86 The court held
that the rule-making power extended to procedural matters only
and that a rule regulating the time and the means of waiving a
jury trial, dealt with a substantive right.
The court in the Halliday case also fell back upon the analo-
gous argument of class legislation, failing to recognize the dis-
tinction between antonomous rules made by the common pleas
courts of every county and state legislation affecting only one
county. Moreover, the court feared that it would give the Cuya-
hoga County courts power that had been denied the legislature.
But the Court overlooked the fact that each county in the state
has its own court rules which are often at great variance with
other counties8s
Thus it has been said that "Ohio has been one of the states
which has given only lip service to the doctrine of the inherent
rule-making power of courts." 88 Further, Wigmore has argued
that when such control is placed in the legislature serious consti-
tutional problems arise concerning the doctrine of separation
powers, and furthermore the judiciary is best equipped to deter-
mine its own rules.8 9
Yet a serious inroad may have been made on the Supreme
Court's reluctance to allow the waiver rule to be changed by
Goldberg Co. v. Emerman.90 Here the court upheld the validity
of Ohio Revised Code Section 1901.24 which authorizes munici-
pal courts to formulate rules requiring requests for jury trials to
be made in writing prior to the trial. The court declared that
the statute merely regulated the method of making the demand
in the interest of economy and orderly procedure and did not
deny a party his right to a jury trial.
Why the legislature may regulate procedure in the Emer-
man case and the county judiciary cannot in the Halliday case
86 Id. at 281.
87 Rule 36 of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Rules of Prac-
tice [Pollack, Ohio Court Rules Annotated (1949) 200-201) was an example
of an attempt to create an effective rule without running afoul of the Halli-
day case.
88 Gertner, The Rule-Making Power of Ohio Courts, 1 Ohio St. L. J. 123
(1935). Also see Woodbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio-
A study in Administrative Law, 13 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 191, 288 (1939).
89 Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Consti-
tutionally, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276 (1928-29).
90 125 Ohio St. 238, 181 N. E. 19 (1932).
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is not understood. Courts, not the legislature, should regulate
court procedures. The only explanation for the Halliday holding
is that the Supreme Court was afraid special court-made rule in
Cuyahoga County would upset the uniform application of the
constitutional right throughout the state. To be sure, as the
Supreme Court pointed out in Emerman, it would affect the ap-
plication of the right, but not the right itself. The Supreme
Court failed to recognize that common pleas courts throughout
the state have the power to invoke different court rules, many
of which affect the application of constitutional rights in differ-
ent ways.
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss2/15
